


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**THE "NORMALIZATION" OF
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY'S
DEFENSE STRUCTURES**



Thomas-Durell Young



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German pacifism, not militarism, may disrupt Bonn's relations with its allies.

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**THE "NORMALIZATION" OF
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY'S
DEFENSE STRUCTURES**

Thomas-Durell Young

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
FOREWORD

The unification of the two German states on October 3, 1990, signified the end of the cold war and the beginning of a new phase in European diplomatic and security affairs. Yet, despite the heightened importance of the Federal Republic of Germany in European affairs, it is surprising that so little interest has been focused on Bonn's attempts to reform its defense structures, while meeting new security objectives, at a time of declining financial resources.

The author of this report argues that notwithstanding accusations that Bonn is attempting to follow an independent diplomatic agenda (which is contentious), the Federal Republic is not nationalizing its defense structures. The coalition government in Bonn has decided that its future security can only be achieved within the context of integrated defense structures with its Western allies. Indeed, Bonn manifests every sign that it intends to scale back its defense activities, while making provisions for improvements in rapid reaction capabilities. Yet, even these reaction formations will require allied support for deployment and sustainment. The rationale for this policy, this study argues, is that German national power can only be legitimated through the continued integration of the Federal Republic's diplomacy and defenses within the context of the European Community and the Transatlantic Alliance. If there is an issue about which Bonn's allies should be concerned, it is the inability of the Federal Republic to reach agreement on the legal bases to project military force outside of the Central Region. German pacifism, not militarism, is what may disrupt Bonn's relations with its allies.

This report meets an identified study requirement as established in SSI's annual research program, *The Army's Strategic Role in a New World Order: A Prioritized Research Program, 1992*.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this report as a contribution to the debate on the future role of the U.S. Army in a post-cold war Europe.



GARY L. GUERTNER

Acting Director, Strategic Studies Institute

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

THOMAS-DURELL YOUNG was a National Security Affairs Analyst at the Strategic Studies Institute from 1988 to 1991, and currently is Associate Research Professor. Prior to this appointment, he was a country risk analyst for BERI, S.A., a Swiss-based consulting firm. Dr. Young received his Ph.D. from the Graduate Institute of International Studies, University of Geneva, Switzerland; his M.A. from the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University; and is a 1990 graduate of the U.S. Army War College. He has published extensively on U.S. alliance issues with particular emphasis on Western Europe and the Southwest Pacific.

SUMMARY

- Bonn is faced with the difficult situation of needing to expand the operational and geographic orientation of the *Bundeswehr* during a time of overall decreased financial outlays.
- Structural limitations in the *Bundeswehr* (e.g., command and control and transportation capabilities) cannot be improved for financial and domestic political rationales.
 - It is conceivable that the *Bundeswehr* will shrink below its peacetime ceiling of 370,000 by the end of 1994 (in accordance with the provisions of the "Two Plus Four Treaty"), due to these internal forces.
 - The inability to make changes to the individual sizes of the three services has had, and will continue to have, a negative impact on the restructuring and staffing of the force.
- Thus, German national security can only be achieved through the continued integration of German defense efforts in NATO and emerging European defense structures.
 - Notwithstanding the many difficulties associated with the renegotiation of the Supplemental Agreements to the NATO Status of Forces Agreement, the retention of allied forces in the Federal Republic remains a key objective of Bonn.
 - At the same time, Bonn must participate, for political reasons, in such initiatives as the Franco-German sponsored "Eurocorps."
- German defense policy, therefore, is oriented toward the "normalization" of selected military capabilities, vice nationalization.

- The lack of desire on the part of Bonn to create an independent defense structure belies the argument that Bonn is nationalizing its defense capabilities, which would support a strongly nationalist foreign policy orientation.
- A key outstanding issue to be resolved by the Federal Republic is exactly what will be the legal and political parameters which will govern the employment of the *Bundeswehr* outside of the Central Region, either for United Nations' missions, or even to meet treaty obligations within the context of NATO, e.g., in the Southern Region.
- A growth in, or institutionalization of, pacifism in Germany is more likely than a resurgence of atavistic German militarism.

GLOSSARY

<i>Abteilung(en)</i>	department(s)
<i>Auswaertiges Amt</i>	Foreign Office
<i>Bundesmarine</i>	Federal Navy
<i>Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (BMVg)</i>	Federal Ministry of Defense
<i>Bundeswehr</i>	Federal Armed Forces
<i>Bundestag</i>	Federal Parliament
<i>Bundeswehr Kommando Ost</i>	Federal Armed Forces Command-East
<i>Erlass</i>	ministerial decree
<i>Flotte</i>	fleet
<i>Fuehrungsbereitschaft(en)</i>	readiness command group(s)
<i>Fuehrungsstab der Streitkraefte—Fue S</i>	Central Staff of the BMVg
<i>gekadert</i>	cadreized
<i>Generalinspekteur der Bundeswehr</i>	Chief of Staff of the Federal Armed Forces
<i>Generalstabsdienst</i>	General Staff Service
<i>Grundgesetz</i>	Basic Law (the Federal Republic's Constitution)
<i>Heimatschutzbrigade</i>	home defense brigade
<i>Heer</i>	Army
<i>Heeresfuehrungskommando</i>	Army Operations Command
<i>Heeresstruktur</i>	army structural plan
<i>Innere Fuehrung</i>	"civic education and leadership"
<i>Inspekteur</i>	chief o' staff
<i>Luftwaffe</i>	Air Force
<i>Luftwaffenstruktur</i>	air force structural plan
<i>Nationale Volksarmee (NVA)</i>	National Peoples' Army of the German Democratic Republic
<i>Oberkommando der Wehrmacht</i>	Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht
<i>Panzergranadier</i>	armored-infantry
<i>Primat der Politik</i>	"primacy of political power over the military"
<i>Staatsbuerger im Uniform</i>	citizen soldier
<i>Streitkraeffefuehrungs- kommando</i>	Armed Forces Command
<i>teilaktiv</i>	"mobilization-dependent"

THE "NORMALIZATION" OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY'S DEFENSE STRUCTURES

Introduction.

As European affairs continue their rapid and at times unpredictable evolution, ever more complex developments demand the time and attention of policymakers and casual observers alike. The end of the cold war, the breakup of the Soviet Union and increasingly frequent manifestations of the "retribalization" of Europe (as evidenced by the explosion in ethnic strife in the Balkans) are only some of the many variables being played out in European affairs. It is not surprising, therefore, that issues which should garner more attention have been all but slighted by the press and analytical community alike. One example of how an otherwise important development has received little attention is the content, objective and ultimate political and security implications of the Federal Republic of Germany's new defense orientation.

As a result of the unification of Germany and the end of East-West military confrontation centered on the now defunct Inter-German Border, the Federal Republic has initiated dramatic changes in its defense structures. For instance, the *Bundeswehr* (Federal Armed Forces) will be cut from its size at unification in October 1990 of 515,000 (which included personnel from the *Nationale Volksarmee*—NVA of the German Democratic Republic) to 370,000 personnel by the end of 1994, will dramatically reduce operational readiness of most ground maneuver forces, and will retire from service many categories of aircraft, tanks and warships. At the same time, the Federal Republic now has the added responsibility of providing for the defense of the former territories of the German Democratic Republic, but this mission must be accomplished *outside* of NATO military structures until the end of 1994, when

the last of the Soviet Western Group of Forces are scheduled to leave eastern Germany.¹ Thus, Bonn must increase the scope of its defense orientation and area of envisaged operation, but at a time when financial resources for defense are falling.

While it is arguable that the challenges facing the Bonn government are, in many ways, similar to those confronting most of its Western allies, the fact is that the Federal Republic is confronted with truly *sui generis* security challenges. How it deals with these problems could greatly affect the future of European stability and security. Bonn must meet its new responsibilities as a unified state with full sovereignty. But it must accomplish this in such a way as not to intimidate its European allies, and thereby possibly endanger hopes for greater integration in Western Europe, all the while assuring Washington that it still needs the Transatlantic security relationship. German officials, therefore, have insisted in their public statements that: as has been the case in the past, in the future, their nation's security can only be achieved *collectively*, notwithstanding the problems associated with the interim national defense of eastern Germany.² The opposite political effects are likely, however, if Bonn's efforts are interpreted as constituting a "nationalization" of its defenses. This particular interpretation,³ supports the contention of some commentators⁴ that nationalization is the ultimate goal of unified Germany, and is the only means for the new European Great Power to pursue its own diplomatic objectives, irrespective of the concerns of its close allies.

In addition, the domestic impact of the announced changes in German defense policy cannot be dismissed. In a country with lingering intense emotions concerning its militarist past, the domestic political repercussions of creating more independent defense structures cannot be underestimated. The early 1992 proposal by the *Bundesministerium der Verteidigung*—BMVg (Federal Ministry of Defense) to create a modest joint national command and control structure resulted in a predictable and inaccurate report in the newsweekly *Der Spiegel*. The news magazine reported that this initiative portends the eventual creation of an "*Oberkommando der*

Wehrmacht" and/or a "*gross-deutscher Generalstab*." [sic]⁵ That this proposal was subsequently rejected by newly installed Federal Defense Minister, Volker Ruehe (largely for personnel and financial limitations), is still an important example of the residual sensitivity in Bonn regarding the appearance of creating "independent" military structures. Yet, whether Bonn will be able to meet its defense obligations to its Alliance partners in the new European security environment, without significantly improving its national command and operational control capabilities, must be judged as being problematic.

Justifiable questions do remain, however, over exactly in which direction Federal Minister of Defense Ruehe and the *BMVg* intend to orient German security structures.⁶ Upon review of the proposed force structure and envisaged command organizations of the *Bundeswehr*, a number of general observations are possible; none of which support the contention that the Federal Republic is nationalizing its defense structure.⁷ First, the Federal Republic will remain integrated in NATO wartime operational control structures. The integrated military planning process of NATO is one of that organization's great successes since, in effect, it allows all participants to know the others' defense programs: a true, if passive, confidence and security-building measure. Rather, the best interpretation one can use to describe efforts at reforming German defense structural shortcomings is that of "normalization," and an incomplete one at that.⁸

Second, Bonn's lack of ambition to create a truly independent defense capability weakens the argument that the Federal Republic intends to pursue its own "national" diplomatic agenda since it will have little in the way of an independent military capability to support such a foreign policy agenda should the need ever arise. While it is true that one may be seeing merely the first steps in an evolutionary process toward the eventual objective of achieving a national defense capability, there is not now, nor on the domestic political horizon, any support for pursuing this end state.

Third and finally, what should concern Bonn's friends and allies is that the Federal Republic's domestic political situation

will remain divided over Bonn's security obligations *outside* of the Central Region. The inability of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU)/Christian Socialist Union (CSU) and the Free Democratic Party (FDP) from summer 1989 until very recently to agree on the constitutionality of military (as opposed to humanitarian) operations under United Nations' sponsorship manifests the strong opposition in the Federal Republic to engaging in military operations outside of the immediate defense of national territory.⁹ Indeed, the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact has resulted in an intense debate in the Federal Republic over such issues as the need for continued conscription and even whether there is still a need for the *Bundeswehr*.¹⁰ It is not without significance that Article 87a of the *Grundgesetz* (Basic Law, or Constitution of the Federal Republic) states, "The Federation shall establish Armed Forces for defense purposes." Thus, it is much less likely that a "militaristic" Germany will evolve, rather than one that manifests a greater degree of "pacifist" policies. Should the latter come to pass, Germany's actions could impede NATO from fulfilling its security obligations to its southern members, as well as from responding to threats to collective Western interests outside of the Alliance's area.

Legal and Political Implications of Full German Sovereignty.

A little understood effect of the unification of the two Germanies is that not only were the two countries unified, but, most importantly, "Germany" acquired full sovereignty over its national affairs.¹¹ From the end of the Second World War until the signing of the "Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany" (known as the "Two Plus Four Treaty") on September 12, 1990, there was no formal peace agreement between the victorious Allied Powers and either German state. In consequence, even after the creation of the Federal Republic in 1949, the Allied Powers retained residual legal rights and privileges over the years. Upon implementation of this treaty, Bonn was confronted for the first time with the necessity to assume greater responsibility for numerous aspects of its national defense, hitherto provided by NATO and the Allied Powers. Moreover, as a sovereign country, the basis

upon which foreign forces are stationed in the Federal Republic will result in changes between Bonn and its allies regarding existing bilateral supplemental agreements to the NATO Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). This particular issue will be dealt with below.

The military implications of changes in the legal status of the Federal Republic have been significant. Bonn now has *sole* responsibility for the security of the former territory of the German Democratic Republic. No foreign forces can be stationed or exercise on east German soil until the completion of the withdrawal of the Soviet Western Group of Forces by the end of 1994 under the terms of the "Two Plus Four Treaty."¹² This particular provision of the treaty has not been without its problems for the *Bundeswehr*. For example, in terms of air defense, the *Luftwaffe* now has the responsibility for policing German airspace, a role previously exercised by NATO largely through the U.S. Air Force and Royal Air Force within the NATO Integrated Air Defense System.¹³ To meet these challenges, on October 3, 1990, the Federal Republic established a provisional joint command (*Bundeswehr Kommando Ost*) at the former headquarters of the NVA at Strausberg, east of Berlin.¹⁴ This headquarters was stood down on July 1, 1991, and *Bundeswehr* units in eastern Germany are now under the command and control of their respective services as is the case in the west.¹⁵

This delineation in German defenses may create operational problems in the future relationship between *Bundeswehr* forces stationed in the west and the east. Those in the west will remain integrated in NATO, and possibly in some as yet undefined future Western European peacetime command and wartime operational control structures. It has not yet been announced whether *Bundeswehr* units stationed in the east after 1994 will fall under NATO international peacetime command structures (i.e., air defense), or wartime operational control arrangements. Moreover, the issue of "deployed" foreign forces east of the now defunct Inter-German border after 1994 still requires resolution by Bonn. What is of interest in this regard, and which has escaped much public commentary, is that an Agreed Minute

to the Two Plus Four Treaty states that the Bonn government may decide unilaterally what constitutes "deployed."¹⁶ Thus, it is not inconceivable that NATO forces and wartime operational control arrangements could be extended eastward after 1994. However, in view of the extreme political sensitivity surrounding this issue at present in the Federal Republic, as seen by British hints in summer 1991 that they were interested in using exercise areas in the east and Bonn's subsequent flat rejection of this proposal,¹⁷ a public pronouncement by Bonn on the future status of this territory may be some time in coming.

The issue of German sovereignty is being felt more immediately by Bonn's allies in regard to the future legal status of their forces stationed on German soil. While the general conditions governing foreign stationing of forces in the Alliance are contained in the NATO SOFA, countries with substantial forces in allied countries normally have supplemental agreements which further define the status of foreign forces in relation to host nation jurisdictions.¹⁸ In the case of the Federal Republic of Germany, foreign forces enjoyed special status and privileges, due, in large part, to the fact that their initial "deployment" emerged from their occupation rights following the Second World War.¹⁹ Later, once the Federal Republic was admitted to NATO and the *Bundeswehr* was created in 1955, the immediacy of the Soviet threat in the Central Region mitigated against changing these legal provisions substantially under the provisions of a 1959 agreement.

Now that Germany has, once again, resumed its full sovereignty and the residual Soviet/Russian military presence, let alone potential threat, in Central Europe continues its rapid disintegration, it is very clear that the legal basis upon which allied forces will remain in the Federal Republic will be considerably different than in the past.²⁰ Bonn's negotiating philosophy appears to center on achieving "reciprocal relationships," although apparently considerable differences have emerged between the positions of the *BMVg* and the *Auswaertiges Amt* (Foreign Office).²¹ The likely outcome of these negotiations is that, in the future, foreign forces stationed

in the Federal Republic will have many of their previous activities and privileges constrained by *German Law*.

Effecting "reciprocal relationships," however, may not be as simple as one might think and is evinced by the slow progress in the negotiations.²² For example, press reports to date indicate that difficulties have been encountered in the negotiations between Bonn on the one hand, and the United Kingdom and the United States on the other. The principal impediment is Bonn's desire to exert greater control over hiring practices, exercise activities (in order to limit noise) and acquire, where feasible, the return of certain American and British training facilities.²³ One can see where achieving this goal could present considerable problems since, at the same time, government and opposition leaders in Bonn have consistently called for the retention of foreign forces in the Federal Republic.²⁴ In addition, "reciprocity" could be difficult to effect. While it is possible that greater numbers of *Bundeswehr* units will deploy to the United States for exercise purposes in the future (due in large part to growing restrictions on military activities in the Federal Republic because of environmental concerns, e.g., excessive noise in training areas and low-altitude flying),²⁵ these increased numbers will not significantly alter the different conditions by which these forces are cross-stationed. The United States will maintain a sizeable ground force (of undeterminable size at this juncture) with a relatively high state of readiness for the purpose of conducting military operations at short notice. This will be considerably different from *Bundeswehr* units and individuals traveling to the United States for set periods of training.²⁶ Hence, both countries' forces will have different stationing realities and requirements, which could make achieving the legal (and political) objective of reciprocity difficult.

To be sure, it is difficult to argue against the laudatory political objective of achieving "reciprocity." The Federal Republic is quite correct in pursuing this goal if Bonn is to convince the German electorate of the long-term importance of maintaining foreign forces in Germany. In consequence, rules affecting the activities of the *Bundeswehr* would also be applicable to foreign forces stationed in Germany.²⁷ Thus, for

example, current arrangements where the *Bundeswehr* must pay DM 25,000 to 30,000 per day to use allied training areas in Germany will need to be renegotiated within the context of attaining reciprocity.²⁸ Or, existing arrangements need to be better explained to the German public that U.S. forward deployed forces are not inexpensive to the American taxpayer and host nation support arrangements are in order. Perhaps the most accurate goal that one can expect to achieve, therefore, is selective reciprocity.

In the final analysis, the issue of German sovereignty, if not carefully managed from both the perspective of Bonn and its allies, could become a major impediment to maintaining close ties among allied forces. Since the *BMVg* is premising future force structure on the maintenance of Western defense integration, severe reductions in NATO forces in the Federal Republic could have significant negative repercussions on the *Bundeswehr*. The reason as to why the *BMVg* feels the need to maintain integration with its NATO allies becomes clear upon reviewing the forces which will define the *Bundeswehr's* future force structure.

Force Structure Issues.

Notwithstanding the fact that the *Bundeswehr* is now responsible for the security of a geographic area one-third greater than before unification, the CDU/CSU/FDP coalition government intends to cut the armed forces by one-fourth and decrease, where possible, defense expenditures. While it is true that the Federal Republic has not witnessed a substantial decrease in its defense budget to date, the need to spend finite funds on a wider array of new activities (e.g., rebuilding defense infrastructure in the east) will have a major impact on all aspects of German defense activities. Additionally, the lack of an immediate and quantifiable threat to the Federal Republic has made defending the defense budget increasingly difficult.

Nonetheless, the coalition government has endorsed a massive reorganization plan for the *Bundeswehr* to enable it to respond better to future security challenges outside of the Central Region. Indeed, it is interesting that the coalition

government has given its approval to this reorientation in the *Bundeswehr* before it has been able to effect the necessary political/legal arrangements to enable such operations. At the same time, in reorganizing the *Bundeswehr* to perform these new missions, Bonn has recognized that it has neither the political support, nor the financial resources to meet these new challenges unilaterally. Bonn has consciously eschewed developing independent structures and fully recognizes the need for the *Bundeswehr* to remain closely integrated within Western military structures. The rationale for this decision becomes obvious when assessing financial limitations, personnel problems, force structure plans, and their combined effect on capabilities and readiness levels.

Finances. In spite of the immense changes that have taken place in the Federal Republic's security environment, the defense budget has faced constant pressure to shrink, irrespective of the *BMVg*'s new responsibilities. An effective 15 percent cut occurred in the budget between 1990 and 1991,²⁹ albeit slight budgetary relief occurred in the financial year 1992 budget (DM 52.12 billion).³⁰ Provisional estimates for the 1993 budget foresees a decrease to DM 50.8 billion.³¹ Ominously for defense planners, budgetary projections for the mid-term anticipate a continued slide in spending, i.e., DM 48.1 billion for 1995.³²

This relative stability in the defense budget has been deemed necessary, even by a government severely strapped for funds due to the immense costs associated with unification, because of the costs the *BMVg* has incurred through unification and assimilation of the *NVA*. One of the unfortunate legacies of unification has been the discovery that the *NVA* (much to everyone's surprise) possessed over 300,000 tons of munitions, which were improperly stored and now need to be maintained safely while awaiting disassembly.³³ Approximately 250,000 tons await destruction in an environmentally sound manner (of which there are 6,000 tons of *pure* TNT alone). For financial year 1992 alone, DM 148 million has been allocated for the dismantling of munitions.³⁴ Former Federal Minister of Defense Gerhard Stoltenberg estimated that the eventual cost of destroying ammunition

stocks could reach DM 4 billion³⁵ and could take up to 10 years to accomplish.

It needs to be mentioned that these costs are in addition to those resulting from the destruction of 10,000 items of Treaty-Limited Equipment as required under the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, whose provisions the Bonn government decided to implement early.³⁶ Due to domestic political exigencies, Federal Defense Minister Ruehe has stated that priority will be given to scraping *NVA* weapons, as opposed to selling them to other countries, especially in Eastern Europe.³⁷ Finally, the *BMVg* must also pay for the environmental clean-up of former *NVA* facilities, in addition to rebuilding defense-related infrastructure. Defense officials have estimated that these requirements alone would require DM 16 billion in outlays over the next few years.³⁸

Exactly how Bonn intends to pay for these expanding financial obligations, with no growth in the defense vote, is by delaying and cutting capital procurement projects. For illustration, Dr. Holger Mey argues that the division of the defense budget between capital procurement on the one hand, and personnel, operations and maintenance on the other, has been relatively constant over the past 20 years: 70/30 percent, respectively. The 25th Fiscal Plan³⁹ projects a change in this ratio to 75/25 percent. It is anticipated, however, by the mid-1990s, this previous balance should be restored.⁴⁰ Thus, the *BMVg* has recommended cuts of DM 44 billion over the next 13 years. In terms of capital acquisitions, projected cuts include the high profile "Fighter-90" project, which was cancelled in June 1992,⁴¹ the Leopard III main battle tank, the Panther "tank killer," while projects like the Franco-German "Tigre" anti-tank helicopter, if they do indeed survive, will have their procurement substantially drawn out.⁴²

The reasonable conclusion one can draw from this state of affairs is that German defense programs, like those of its allied partners, will increasingly face severe financial restrictions. That these financial constraints on the *BMVg* will occur at a time when it is attempting to reorganize the *Bundeswehr* with the aim of meeting new missions does not portend well for German defense. Clearly, some activities, operations and

maintenance, and capital acquisition will have to be scaled back in order to fund others. In discussing this dilemma, the *Generalinspekteur der Bundeswehr* (Chief of Staff of the Federal Armed Forces), General Klaus Naumann, recently suggested that exercises might have to be reduced as a means to save money.⁴³ Federal Defense Minister Ruehe's initial months in office have been marked by a strong drive to curtail defense spending (e.g., canceling German participation in high-profile weapons programs). This drive for economy, however, has resulted in a situation whereby planning in the "structures, deployment, materiel requirement, and command and control organization" of the *Bundeswehr* no longer corresponds to available funding.⁴⁴ It is safe to conclude, therefore, that the *Bundeswehr* will not be able to modernize, as it previously envisaged, nor will its overall readiness level of maneuver and support units be maintained at current levels over time.⁴⁵

Personnel. The Federal Republic (with agreement of the German Democratic Republic) stated on August 30, 1990, at the Vienna negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, and which was reiterated in the "Two Plus Four Treaty,"⁴⁶ that it would reduce the *Bundeswehr* from its then current pre-unification size of 460,000 (1,300,000 in wartime) to 370,000 (900,000 to 700,000 in wartime) of which no more than 345,000 could be in the army and air force.⁴⁷ This particular number was agreed to by former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl at Stavropol in July 1990,⁴⁸ and apparently without the *BMVg*'s participation.⁴⁹ Thus, by the end of 1994, the *Bundeswehr* should consist of 40,000 officers, over 130,000 noncommissioned officers, 40,000 privates, and slightly over 150,000 conscripts. It will also be necessary that about 25,000 volunteers annually need to agree either to extend their service or choose professional military careers.

On paper, at least, the *Bundeswehr* will remain the largest military establishment in Western and Central Europe. However, a number of problems associated with personnel will increasingly affect both the quantitative, as well as qualitative, characteristics of these forces. For example, upon unification,

the *Bundeswehr* gained 103,000 personnel by amalgamating select personnel from the *NVA*. By the end of 1994, it is anticipated that approximately 50,000 of the end strength of 370,000 will be former *NVA* or personnel from the five new eastern *Laender*.⁵⁰ At the end of 1991, the strength of the *Bundeswehr* was 430,400 officers and enlisted.⁵¹ Thus, the *Bundeswehr* must decrease its ranks considerably in order to meet the 370,000 floor; assuming, of course, that figure represents a floor, as opposed to a ceiling.

In an environment where sizeable personnel reductions are an impending reality, morale obviously suffers and unintended effects are bound to occur. For instance, incentives to encourage personnel to leave the services have resulted in fewer officers than expected, but more noncommissioned officers (NCOs) than desired, departing the service.⁵² Of course, in Western military establishments, NCOs are the backbone of their particular service. However, in the especial case of the *Bundeswehr* (following historical German patterns), the reliance on NCOs is particularly heavy. And indeed, the loss of experienced NCOs could not come at a worse time for the *Bundeswehr*. First, the new master plan for army development, *Heeresstruktur 5*, has attempted to address a long-standing problem in the army, that being to improve command density. The *Bundeswehr* has the lowest ratio of officers to enlisted men in all of Europe.⁵³ At a time when larger numbers of senior NCOs (and junior officers) are necessary, NCO ranks are diminishing and interest is increasingly waning on the part of qualified young men to pursue a military career.⁵⁴ Second, the *NVA* was structured upon the Soviet model and, therefore, no professional NCO cadre, comparable to Western standards, existed.⁵⁵ Therefore, there is now a dearth of qualified NCOs in the east which needs to be filled, either by training (a time consuming process), or by transfers eastward (not an attractive option due to poor living conditions in the east).⁵⁶

Moreover, in addition to the problems associated with maintaining competitive career opportunities for younger men, the recent massive increase in conscientious objectors, particularly following unification (from 75,000 in 1990 to

150,000 in 1991) makes it likely that, in the future, only 50 percent of eligible young men will be available for military service.⁵⁷ This, in turn, calls into question the entire issue of the continuation of compulsory military service, which has become a very sensitive issue in the Federal Republic. In fact, conscription has existed in name only since 1983 when the government made conscientious objector status more easy to acquire. Recent public opinion surveys have revealed that approximately 66 percent of those questioned supported the creation of a professional military. The length of time a conscript serves has also come under criticism. While other Western European countries have moved to decrease the length of time, it will surely be difficult in the coming years for the current coalition government to maintain its commitment of the current 12 months' period of conscription. Should this period be reduced, the value of conscription to the *Bundeswehr* will drop since once these individuals are fully trained, they leave the service.⁵⁸

Should the *BMVg* succeed in its efforts to create a credible rapid response capability (which will only contain conscripts willing to undertake such tasks), and even if conscription were continued, the concept of *eine Bundeswehr* will still be open to question. What one will have is a small, well-equipped core force of volunteers and professionals, alongside a larger remainder with older equipment, manned largely by conscripts.⁵⁹ In terms of personnel, therefore, it is clear that serious problems remain to be solved.⁶⁰

The Services. Without going too far into detail, it is safe to state that the size and capabilities of the three individual services of the *Bundeswehr* will have undergone significant reduction by 1995. What is important to understand, as well, is that no service has been structured, to date, to operate independently in large formations. Despite some planned improvements in the areas of rapid reaction, there are *no* plans to improve substantially this aspect of the *Bundeswehr's* structure.

Das Heer, or the Army, is slated to contract from its 1991 strength of 300,800 to 255,400 by the end of 1994. While the absolute size of this reduction seems modest, when measured

in terms of maneuver units, the effect is quite striking. The Army will lose four of its current 12 divisions (albeit two "division staffs" *may be* retained, but will concentrate on planning for operations outside of the Central Region).⁶¹ Of the 48 combat brigades in the *Bundeswehr* (six being *Heimatschutzbrigaden*—home defense brigades) and 18 former NVA motor rifle and tanks regiments, only 28 are to remain. Of these, only six will be fully manned: three *Panzergrenadier*, two airborne, one mountain, in addition to the German contribution to the Franco-German Brigade. These six brigades will represent the Army's standing rapid reaction capability and participate in such missions as the Alliance's new Rapid Reaction Formations.⁶² Two brigades will be *gekadert* (cadred) with a full complement of equipment, but with personnel dispersed to other units.⁶³ The remaining 19 maneuver brigades will become mobilization-dependent (*teilaktiv*), with approximately 60 percent manning in peacetime. They will have four battalions, two of which will be cadre.

Readiness and availability times will vary. In some cases, these cadre battalions will require 6 months after mobilization before becoming operational,⁶⁴ although expansion within 30 days will be possible.⁶⁵ Of importance, approximately 50 percent of the Army's main weapon systems will be operated and commanded by reservists.⁶⁶ It is due to this increased reliance on reservists that the *BMVg* has announced a new training scheme whereby fewer reservists will be called up for exercises, but their participation will be made more attractive, according to State Secretary Bernd Wilz.⁶⁷

Nonetheless, it must be understood that achieving the ambitious objectives set out in *Heeresstruktur 5* depends upon having necessary personnel. Additionally, it is just not an issue of absolute numbers, but the Army must also be able to retain in service personnel of suitable rank and branch specialization if it is to solve, for instance, the problem of command density. It has been rumored that *Heeresstruktur 5* is more delicate than initially envisaged to these personnel requirements. The February 1992 refusal on the part of the ruling CDU/CSU/FDP coalition to enable the Army to grow by 3,100 at the expense

of the Federal Navy,⁶⁸ in addition to the departure from service of needed personnel (in terms of rank and specialty), have combined to make the outlook for *Heeresstruktur 5* very problematic indeed. By 1993, a massive revision of this document may be required.

Die Luftwaffe, or Air Force, is slated to shrink from its 1991 complement of 94,100 to 82,400 by 1995. The most immediate challenge to the *Luftwaffe* is to enforce the Federal Republic's sovereignty over its national airspace.⁶⁹ Achieving this task has not been without its own peculiar problems. The *Luftwaffe* is not well equipped to carry out air policing and air defense roles. Therefore, its entire inventory of F-4 Phantoms are, or are in the process of being, converted and modernized for this role.⁷⁰ However, these conversions are insufficient for the task, and have resulted in the decision to retain in service the inherited 24 MIG-29s from the NVA, notwithstanding the numerous difficulties of maintaining them.⁷¹ Moreover, selective aspects of the former NVA's air defense network are being employed and will be retained after 1995, where feasible.

Luftwaffenstruktur 4 envisages a sizeable rationalization of aircraft and organizational structure.⁷² By 1995, combat wings are to decrease from 16 to 10, surface to-air missile wings are to drop from 20 to 6, and transport wings are to drop from 8 to 6.⁷³ In terms of airframes, this translates into a cut from approximately 1,000 (to include aircraft from the former NVA) to approximately 500 in 1995. Of immediate importance is the need for the *Luftwaffe* to obtain replacements for its fleet of aging F-4 Phantoms and Mig-29s and to acquire improved airlift capabilities. In June 1992, Federal Defense Minister Ruehe announced the cancellation of Germany's participation in the European Fighter Aircraft project ("Fighter 90") due in large part to massive cost overruns in its development.⁷⁴ While solving the short-term requirement to achieve financial savings, the *Luftwaffe* still needs a new replacement fighter.⁷⁵ Federal Defense Minister Ruehe has announced that a replacement fighter will not be decided upon until 1996.⁷⁶ In terms of improved transport aircraft, former Federal Defense Minister Stoltenberg announced that the requisite number of aircraft (50) could not be procured for under DM 15-17 billion.⁷⁷

In consequence, the acquisition of this capability is only being contemplated in conjunction with Bonn's Western European allies.⁷⁸

Die Bundesmarine, or the Federal Navy, will undergo a significant diminution in resources over a longer period of time than its sister services. The Federal Navy is to contract from 35,500 in 1991 to 32,200 in 1995. However, it is anticipated that these personnel reductions are to continue to drop beyond the year 2000 to approximately 25,500. This transformation must also occur at a time when the Federal Navy must expand its operational horizon. As part of the navy's plan, *Flotte 2005*, the number of combatants and support vessels is to be *halved*.⁷⁹ While the number of frigates and destroyers will remain constant (approximately 16), the rest of the fleet will experience serious reductions, e.g., the submarine fleet (24 to 12), patrol boats (40 to 20), mine counter-measures vessels (56 to 25), support units (28 to 10).⁸⁰ What is important about these reductions is that they will occur when Alliance commitments to standing naval forces will be increased (e.g., German participation in the newly created Standing Naval Force Mediterranean).⁸¹

At the same time, the Federal Navy, according to Admirals Frank and Giermann, is obsolete and must be modernized. Of significance to this discussion, the authors note that notwithstanding the procurement of tenders for the patrol boat force, there remains a requirement for four logistic supply vessels to support the destroyer/frigate force.⁸² Obviously, without them, the Federal Navy will lack the *independent* capability to deploy out of region.

Assessment. In analyzing the overall implications of these separate reorganization plans for the force structure of the *Bundeswehr*, a number of observations become apparent. First, despite the efforts of the *BMVg* to improve the ability of the *Bundeswehr* to deploy out of the Central Region in a limited sense, it will continue to suffer from severe operational limitations due to gaps in capabilities. While it is true that efforts apparently have been launched to improve these identified shortcomings (e.g., airlift), there is no short-term move to acquire these capabilities unilaterally of common

Western European efforts. Second, notwithstanding the move to create an improved rapid reaction capability (heretofore not experienced *Bundeswehr*), the overall readiness of the *Bundeswehr* is planned to drop considerably. Military operations of the size in excess of the rapid reaction units or of medium duration will require mobilization; always a politically difficult decision in a democracy.

The evident conclusion one can draw from these analyses is that despite noticeable efforts to improve force projection capabilities, they will still be modest. In addition, the *Bundeswehr* will depend upon allied assistance and support for deployments of any significant size in, as well as out of, the Central Region for many years to come. In essence, this is hardly a sound plan to pursue if Bonn is intent upon creating an independent national defense structure.

United Germany and Civil-Military Relations.

In assessing the future of German defense policy it is crucial to consider the effects that unification may eventually have on the *Bundeswehr*, as well as on future civil-military relations.⁸³ Apropos the former point, the influence of a unified Germany is already being manifested in terms of changing public attitudes toward the need for national defense and the consequent changing image of the *Bundeswehr* in German society. As for the latter issue, a revealing example of how the ruling CDU/CSU/FDP coalition envisages civil-military relations to be conducted can be seen in Federal Defense Minister Ruehe's rejection of the *BMVg*'s spring 1992 proposals to reform the *Bundeswehr*'s command and operational control structure. What is apparent is that a growing public skepticism of the continued need for the *Bundeswehr* is being accompanied by the ruling coalition's inclination (for a variety of reasons) to continue an important manifestation of defense singularization.

The Bundeswehr and Pathos? As regards the future role of the *Bundeswehr* in the Federal Republic, one can identify two emerging problems: first, a growing questioning of the mere *raison d'être* of the *Bundeswehr* after the cold war, and

second, its changing relationship to German society. The end of the cold war has forced the Federal Republic to confront the difficult issue that the *Bundeswehr* no longer exists solely to *defend* the Central Region (i.e., German territory). The recognition of the existence of the Federal Republic's Western security responsibilities, which lay outside of Central Europe, is slowly gaining acceptance in Bonn. However, in so doing, the previously held concept of the character of the *Bundeswehr* in German democratic society perforce must evolve. It has proven to be a very difficult challenge indeed to argue in the German political debate that participation in even peacekeeping operations is not a harbinger of a return to German militarism. The recent experience of the intense political debate in Bonn, inspired by the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), over the sending of *Bundesmarine* units to the Adriatic to monitor the United Nations' arms embargo against Serbia, is instructive in this regard.⁸⁴

One can already see forces impeding this metamorphosis of the *Bundeswehr* through the growing number of conscientious objectors, especially from the former Democratic Republic. "Military" organizations, however defined, are not widely accepted as legitimate by many in the east. This is not surprising given the almost universal disdain in that society for the NVA, plus over 45 years of occupation by the Soviet Western Group of Forces. That the *Bundeswehr* was created in 1955 with the explicit intention of removing it from previous undemocratic institutions and traditions of Prussian-German military practice is not yet widely understood in the east.

Indeed, the success in making the *Bundeswehr* an institution dedicated to the protection of German democracy that accepts, without reservation, *Primat der Politik* ("primacy of political power over the military"), while respecting a serving individual's civil rights and human dignity, should be assessed as constituting one of the Federal Republic's major accomplishments.⁸⁵ Nonetheless, it can be expected that it will take some years before the *Bundeswehr's* guiding concept of *Staatsbuerger im Uniform* ("citizen soldier"), as codified in the *Bundeswehr's* guiding philosophy of *Innere Fuehrung*

("civic education and leadership"),⁸⁶ will be widely understood, let alone accepted, in a skeptical and cynical eastern Germany. Not surprisingly, this new intense scrutiny being placed on the *Bundeswehr* by German society, during a time of it being required to reorganize and reorient its mission, has resulted in what one study has identified as a deep identity crisis on the part of many officers and soldiers.⁸⁷

It is perhaps a direct result of this serious political and social questioning of the need for the *Bundeswehr* in an increasingly financially-strapped Federal Republic that one intermittently reads in the press leaked reports from the *BMVg* (and subsequently officially denied) to decrease the size of the *Bundeswehr* from its projected 370,000 limit to 220,000-250,000 by 1995, and possibly completely professionally-manned.⁸⁸ In any case, should personnel levels in, for instance, the Army, drop below 200,000, the personnel, training and financial difficulties associated with maintaining conscription will exceed its benefits to the *Bundeswehr*, according to former Lieutenant General Joerg Schoenbohm.⁸⁹

The Command and Control Dilemma. Concerning the recent record of civil-military relations, a revealing case of the attitudes of ruling the CDU/CSU/FDP coalition concerning the *Bundeswehr* in the unified Germany can be gleaned from the controversy surrounding efforts to reform existing national joint operational control structures. Under constitutional provisions and administrative directives of the Federal Republic, the creation of a national joint command and control structure can only be accomplished within strict legal confines; as is the case in any democracy. Articles 65(a) and 115(b) of the *Grundgesetz* stipulate that command over the *Bundeswehr* can only be exercised by the Federal Minister of Defense during peacetime, to be transferred to the Federal Chancellor upon the promulgation of a state of defense. These articles enshrine the concept of civilian control over the military. This legal provision was the result of the intention of post-war German political leaders and the Western Allied Powers to institutionalize the concept of *Primat der Politik*.⁹⁰

A further definition of the relationship between the Federal Minister of Defense and the *Generalinspekteur der*

Bundeswehr occurred on March 21, 1970, in the form of what has become known as the "*Blankeneser Erlass*," or ministerial decree. Under existing administrative regulations, the *Generalinspekteur der Bundeswehr* is not directly in the chain of command between the Federal Chancellor/Federal Minister of Defense and the *Inspekteur* (Chief of Staff) of the individual services, or even NATO command structures. In consequence, his position in this area is only advisory and he has *no* authority to exercise wartime operational control over the German armed services. The three individual service *Inspekteur* are also limited by this decree to exercising peacetime command and control over their respective services.⁹¹ Finally, the Central Staff of the *BMVg* (*Fuehrungsstab der Streitkraefte—Fue S*) is simply not structured to exercise operational control over *Bundeswehr* units.⁹²

In crisis or wartime, operational control over *Bundeswehr* units assigned to NATO would be exercised by NATO commanders. There is, for instance, no German national command structure of Army forces above the Corps level. Such operational control would be provided by the new NATO LANDCENT Headquarters, which is to replace the previous two Army Groups (North and Central). This command, in turn, reports to AFCENT, which is commanded by a German four-star general.⁹³ In essence, until the unification of Germany, the *Bundeswehr* was structured to be employed mainly as an instrument for the defense of the Central Region, within NATO wartime operational control structures.⁹⁴ Following unification, German defense officials had to reassess their country's security requirements, to include improving the *Bundeswehr's* existing national operational control structure, both for the national defense of eastern German territory, as well as to engage in even the most basic joint operations, to include humanitarian missions, outside of German territory.

This need to carry out and control joint operations did not include the proposal to create "*ein neuer gross-deutscher Generalstab*" [*sic*] or an "*Oberkommando der Wehrmacht*", as the editors of *Der Spiegel* have speculated.⁹⁵ Indeed, there is

considerable confusion within and outside of Germany concerning proper nomenclature. By way of explanation, there already exists in the *Bundeswehr* a *Generalstabsdienst* (General Staff Service).⁹⁶ But this small cadre of officers does not possess command and control authority by virtue of this designation, let alone do they dictate national policy. In short, they do not constitute a *Generalstab* in an atavistic sense. But, if the Federal Republic is to fulfill its obligations to NATO, the Western European Union and the United Nations, it will need to increase its national command and control capability to coordinate the military missions of the three services.

Indeed, the need for some form of joint operational control structure was made abundantly clear during the conduct of *Bundeswehr* humanitarian relief operations carried out in Iran, Iraq, and Turkey in spring 1991.⁹⁷ According to a German press report, during this deployment of 500 *Bundeswehr* personnel, Major General Georg Bernhardt's command channels had to be routed through 23 offices in the *BMVg* and other ministries. Even within the *Bundeswehr* deployment to the Middle East, there was confusion. For instance, *Fue S-III-6* (planning) was responsible for operations in Turkey and Iran, while *Fue Luftwaffe-III-3* was in charge of *Luftwaffe* missions in Iraq, within the framework of the United Nations.⁹⁸ Even SPD defense expert, Dr. Egon Bahr, has gone on record (using a poor choice of words) supporting the creation of a new "*Generalstab*."⁹⁹ This, in itself, is an unexpected development given the past strict SPD interpretation of what the *Grundgesetz* allowed in terms of command and control.¹⁰⁰ In brief, the *BMVg* was confronted with proposing changes in the existing structure, which would not, of course, be inimical to the Democratic ideals enshrined in the *Grundgesetz*.

In view of the various legal guidelines outlined above, as well as the politically sensitive nature of restructuring the command and control structures of the *Bundeswehr*, the *BMVg* proposed the following solution (see Figure 1).¹⁰¹ Since it would not be possible to maintain a large standing command and control structure due to personnel reductions,¹⁰² it was proposed that a *Streitkraeffuehrungskommando* (Armed Forces Command) be established at Koblenz. The standing




Figure 1. *BMVg* Proposal for a New Command and Control Structure.

complement of the *Streitkraeffuehrungskommando* was envisaged to be approximately 80 to 100 individuals. This small joint headquarters would largely limit itself to planning national joint operations. From the perspective of the *BMVg*, this proposed joint headquarters would be capable of supporting a wide range of military operations, to include crisis management. As an interim measure, until the *Streitkraeffuehrungskommando* was created, *Fuehrungsbereitschaften* (readiness command groups) were to be expanded. *Fuehrungsbereitschaften* exist in each of the civilian and military *Abteilungen* (departments), to include *Fue S*, and *Fuehrungsbereitschaft BMVg*. The latter comprises personnel from all *Abteilungen* of the *BMVg*, and it has been proposed that it should be upgraded to manage crisis situations more effectively.

This proposed joint headquarters, it must be stressed, would be distinct from the new *Heeresfuehrungskommando* (Army Operations Command) also being established in Koblenz at the previous home of *III Korps*. This headquarters, of approximately 100 personnel, will be led by a three-star general and will exercise command and control over the three Army Corps for national tasks and coordinate plans with NATO headquarters.¹⁰⁴ Its span of control is envisaged to encompass approximately 300 posts. Moreover, the *BMVg* intended that this command would be given priority in its development and, consequently, would be fused to the *Streitkraeffuehrungskommando*, when required, to provide crucial command support to its joint counterpart.

Thus, the *BMVg* proposed creating a small joint headquarters that could exercise national operational control over joint *Bundeswehr* forces. It was envisaged that should circumstances require a national military response, a task force commander would be designated by the Federal Chancellor or the Federal Minister of Defense. To maintain the legal principle of civilian control over the military, the transfer of operational control of specified *Bundeswehr* units by the Federal Chancellor/Federal Minister of Defense, for a clearly defined mission and for a specific period of time, to a task force commander, would be carried out. By following these

provisions, the *BMVg* felt that it could employ *Bundeswehr* units for national, European or U.N. operations, without changing current law and regulations.

Federal Defense Minister Ruehe rejected the *BMVg*'s proposal to create the *Streitkraeffuehrungskommando* in spring 1992, but his rationale for doing so is not exactly clear. Apparently, the personnel difficulties being experienced in the *Bundeswehr* have resulted in a shortage of suitable staff officers to man headquarters throughout the *Bundeswehr* and NATO. One should not ignore, for instance, that the *Bundeswehr* will need to staff the German portion of the proposed Franco-German sponsored "Euro-Corps" headquarters to be located in Strasbourg. Attempts to rectify these difficulties through shifting personnel within the Federal Armed Forces have been opposed by the government due to not wishing to evade the combined size of the Army and Air Force as established by the Two-Plus-Four Treaty.¹⁰⁵

Moreover, one cannot discount the impact of a new Federal Defense Minister (Ruehe) attempting to make an early major impact on the *BMVg* and a strong-willed *Generalinspekteur der Bundeswehr* (Naumann). This interpretation is supported in certain press reports that the proposed changes in the command structure were to include giving the *Generalinspekteur* greater authority over the three service chiefs and improved access to the Federal Chancellor and the Federal Security Council.¹⁰⁶ This initiative would substantially increase the power of the office of the *Generalinspekteur* and would relegate the three service chiefs to largely administrative and training functions. The response in *Der Spiegel* to this proposal and to the creation of a new national command structure was to typify it as megalomania ("*Groessenwahn*") on the part of the generals.¹⁰⁷ Shortly after taking office in April, Federal Defense Minister Ruehe stated that he would not support upgrading the position of the *Generalinspekteur* and would not approve the proposed national command authority.¹⁰⁸ What type of command appears to be evolving (see Figure 2) is one where emphasis will be placed on improving existing service command organizations, to include ameliorating joint capabilities, augmented by *Fuehrungs-*




Figure 2. Emerging German Command and Control Structure.

bereitshaffen, and employing the task force principle for responding to national crisis. When activated by the Federal Chancellor/Federal Defense Minister, one of the three service operations commands would be given the task of forming an *ad hoc* task force, likely to be made of elements from all three services. The task force commander will report to his immediate operations commander, who will report to the service *Inspekteur*, who will be under the direct command of the Federal Chancellor/Federal Minister of Defense. "Jointness" will be effected through the presence of service liaison officers in each of the operational commands of the three services. This will require, of course, all forces and operational control structures to be more flexible than they have been in the past, in order to respond to multi-role requirements.¹⁰⁹ In any case, this structure can only be assessed as being suitable for the immediate, as opposed to the emerging, command and operational control requirements of the *Bundeswehr*.

What this lengthy analysis of the controversy surrounding attempts to improve the *Bundeswehr's* national joint command and operational control structures indicates for current and future civil-military relations is that the ruling CDU/CSU/FDP coalition is apparently apprehensive to effect any substantive change in the existing relationship between government and senior military authorities. Notwithstanding the clear, logical need to improve national command structures for a unified Germany (as demonstrated in German operations in the Middle East in 1991), Bonn is unwilling to allow this to happen. Perhaps the domestic and international political costs involved in solving this vestige of the "singularization" of its defense policy are simply too great to confront at this time.

What is interesting, however, is that no leading politician has stated that the Federal Republic should continue to rely solely on NATO structures, nor has one expressed opposition to the need for the *Bundeswehr* to have a national operational control capability.¹¹⁰ In the final analysis, there is *no* question that *Primat der Politik* remains sacrosanct in the Federal Republic and the *BMVg* has simply been required to adapt its command and operational control reorganization to conform to

political dictates. What Bonn's allies need to discern is whether this particular exercise in civil-military affairs is merely a healthy manifestation of the bureaucratic process in a democracy, or whether it reflects a growing apprehension on the part of the ruling CDU/CSU/FDP coalition to attempt to seek important reforms in defense structure due to the lack of German public support. How the ruling coalition is able to effect the necessary legal and political changes to allow the deployment of *Bundeswehr* units outside of the Central Region will be an important indicator in this regard.

Implications.

Upon review of the many financial, personnel, force structure, and command challenges facing the *Bundeswehr*, it is difficult to accept the proposition that, at this point, Bonn has any ambition to create a national defense capability, *outside* of Alliance structures. According to no less an authority than Federal Defense Minister Ruehe, "The goal must be to make the *Bundeswehr* an 'army in the alliance'..."¹¹¹ Even where there are efforts to improve military capabilities, these structures are modest and their potential effectiveness, particularly for conducting operations outside of the Central Region, must be assessed as being problematic, especially if solely a national endeavor. Moreover, there does not appear to be *any* political support in the ruling coalition or in the SPD opposition to rectify these remaining shortcomings in the Federal Republic's defense capabilities.¹¹² These gaps in *Bundeswehr* capabilities will have to be met by Bonn's allies in NATO. Consequently, Bonn has pursued not only a vigorous policy to encourage the maintenance of Western military structures (i.e., NATO), but indeed to create new ones (e.g., the Franco-German sponsored "European Corps.")¹¹³

This prognosis of the Federal Republic's defense policy and capabilities hardly supports, therefore, charges leveled against Bonn that it is pursuing a national and "assertive" foreign policy agenda.¹¹⁴ Whether or not Bonn does indeed intend to pursue a more national diplomatic agenda is beyond the scope of this report. What is pertinent to this essay is that notwithstanding the foreign policy objectives of Bonn, the

Federal Republic evinces *no* intention to create a defense capability to support nationalized external policies. Indeed, to the contrary, what one sees in both foreign and defense policies is a strong emphasis on the part of Bonn to integrate external objectives into international organizations and efforts in order to maintain stability and predictability in its region.¹¹⁵

There are defense and diplomatic rationales for this policy. In terms of defense, the acknowledged and accepted structural limitations which will continue to characterize the *Bundeswehr* necessitate the continuation of close relations with Western integrated defense structures. While the *Bundeswehr* will perforce assume a greater role in the defense of its territory, German officials have been at pains since unification to stress the continued need for NATO defense structures for the Central Region. And, should Bonn ever decide on deploying forces outside of the Central Region, it would literally rely upon its Western allies for moving and then sustaining elements of the *Bundeswehr*.¹¹⁶ Consequently, German officials have been consistent and very vocal in their public admonitions that the United States both retain forces in the Federal Republic, as well as remain intimately involved in NATO's military structures.¹¹⁷

As regards foreign policy limitations, the defense challenges faced by the Federal Republic also underscore the limited foreign policy options available to Bonn. It would appear that Bonn's policy of pressing for the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia in 1991¹¹⁸ has blinded many in Europe and North America to the immutable constants which constrain German diplomacy. The unification of the two Germanies has not obviated the overriding need for any government in Bonn to have German national power legitimated through European political and economic integration, as well as through military integration in the Transatlantic Alliance. Without the existence of these institutions, Bonn runs the serious risk of its national power losing acceptance and legitimacy in Europe. Only with this understanding can one appreciate Bonn's persistent and public efforts to balance its continued strong support for NATO, while attempting to placate a nervous France through the

Federal Republic's support for creating a European defense identity.¹¹⁹

Indeed, what the Federal Republic's allies ought to fear is not a resurrection of Germany militarism, directed by an invidious *Oberkommando der Wehrmacht*, but rather, as argued by Christoph Bertram, a Germany that opts to turn inward due to the stresses of unification¹²⁰ and a government in Bonn politically unable or unwilling to support its allies in military operations outside of the immediate Central Region. The inability heretofore on the part of the CDU/CSU parties in the ruling coalition to reach agreement with its coalition partner, the FDP, let alone with the SPD¹²¹ and sundry minor leftist parties in the *Bundestag* (the Federal Parliament), concerning the legal basis for the *Bundeswehr* to participate in U.N.-sponsored peacekeeping missions, in addition to military operations outside of the immediate Central Region,¹²² demonstrates the fragility of political consensus in the Federal Republic over the extent of meeting Bonn's international responsibilities. The political uproar led by the SPD in July 1992 over the dispatch of maritime units to the Adriatic, and the subsequent recall of the *Bundestag* to debate the issue, are excellent examples of this lack of bipartisan consensus.¹²³ It is imperative that political consensus on this issue be reached, since without it the Federal Republic would likely face a new challenge to its legitimacy of national power: an unwillingness to support its allies, with military means if necessary. The constructive efforts on the part of Federal Defense Minister Ruehe¹²⁴ and CDU/CSU *Bundestag* group defense spokesman, Karl Lamers,¹²⁵ to reach consensus with the SPD on defense issues, particularly on the matter of participating in United Nations' operations and out-of-area campaigns, may well result in a welcome return to a bipartisan defense consensus in the *Bundestag*.

Thus, unless Bonn accepts its responsibilities to defend its NATO allies outside of the Central Region, the Federal Republic will be unable to achieve its stated external policy objectives. In addition, efforts on the part of the Federal Republic and France to establish a European Corps¹²⁶ and efforts to create a European defense community could also

terminally flounder if Bonn is unable to convince its European allies that it stands prepared to defend them and their vital interests. But it must be understood that these are political difficulties which can only be resolved within the context of the domestic German political debate. Hence, as this report has argued, a resurgence of German militarism is not an issue with which Bonn's allies and friends ought to be concerned. A continuation of, or increase in, German pacifism, however, is another matter entirely and one that warrants close observation.

Recommendations.

- An improved understanding of the many financial, personnel, societal, and political (domestic and international) challenges facing the Federal Republic's defense reorientation and reorganization is needed.
- The Federal Republic has recognized that domestic and international political considerations will not allow the nationalization of its defense structures, even if there were a consensus to develop such a capability, which there is not. In this regard, it is essential that the *Bundeswehr* remain active in NATO military structures and whatever exclusively European defense organizations that may emerge.
- An important element of this continued participation in international military structures is the continued stationing of foreign forces on *sovereign* German territory. While appreciating the many justifiable concerns the United States and its allies have concerning the renegotiation of their Supplemental Agreements to the NATO SOFA, it is politically imperative that an agreement be reached which the Bonn government can sell to its electorate. "Selective reciprocity," as a guiding principle, may provide the necessary means to achieve this illusive objective.
- The *Bundeswehr* is undergoing a fundamental restructuring and reorganization. For instance, it is unlikely that *Heeresstruktur 5* will remain as the

envisaged organizational plan of the Army. During this period of upheaval, it is incumbent that the Federal Republic's allies assist it as it attempts to prepare itself for operations outside of its previous narrow confines of the Central Region.

- The increasing questioning by the German public of the need for the *Bundeswehr* makes it all the more politically imperative that the *BMVg* can justify force structure and missions through German participation in multinational formations, irrespectively of the degree of organizational and military integration.
- The proposed German national command and operational control structure is being organized within the justifiable confines of *Primat der Politik*. Notwithstanding this fundamental consideration, it is incumbent that Bonn's allies quietly state that as *currently envisaged*, this proposed structure will not lead to unity of command or effort, either within the *Bundeswehr* or multinational formations. In effect, no one military official is truly responsible for military operations and this is an act of self-singularization. The emerging German command structure can be likened to the state of affairs which existed in the United States prior to the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. While appreciating the political sensitivity surrounding the creation of such an office, the lack of effective command and operational control at the highest level could result in operational confusion, which could in turn destroy the slowly emerging consensus in Germany to participate in United Nations' and Alliance-sponsored military operations outside of the Central Region.
- The future outlook for the Federal Republic's ability to conduct military operations outside of the Central Region has yet to be decided and it is still conceivable that strong pacifist tendencies in that country could still influence the eventual outcome. For instance, a very restrictive amendment to the *Grundgesetz*

governing the employment of the *Bundeswehr* remains a possibility. Such an eventuality would place serious strains on NATO and could effectively destroy efforts to create a European defense identity.

ENDNOTES

1. For background on this issue see my essay, "Angst in Bonn: Securing Eastern Germany and the Disposition of the Soviet Western Group of Forces," *Strategic Review*, Volume 19, No. 4, Fall 1991, pp. 75-80.

2. There are many instances where German officials have stated this policy objective. One of the most recent has been Federal Chancellor Kohl's reported remarks at the *Bundeswehr's* commanders conference held in Leipzig. See, Deutsche Presse-Agentur (Hamburg), May 12, 1992 in, *Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)*-WEU-92-093, May 13, 1992, p. 23.

3. See, for instance, Geoffrey Van Orden, "The *Bundeswehr* in Transition," *Survival*, Volume 33, No. 4, July-August 1991, p. 353. It is interesting to note that many writers, to include Van Orden, use the terminology "renationalization." I feel this is incorrect. "Renationalization" implies the rearmament of the pre-May 1945 German state, which, therefore, includes all the negative atavistic connotations of the German militarist past. This is currently not the case. The Federal Republic was established in 1949, armed itself in 1955, and has never had an independent national defense policy. In essence, even if Bonn were to establish a national defense policy, it would be done within the context of the *Grundgesetz* and the overriding principle of "*Primat der Politik*."

4. One example of this weak argument is found in the Evans and Novak editorial in, *The Washington Post*, August 30, 1991. Josef Joffe counters these arguments in, *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* (Muenchen), January 24, 1992 in, *FBIS*-WEU-92-017, January 27, 1992, pp. 17-18.

5. See, *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), April 6, 1992, pp. 18-21, especially, p. 19. Note that the editors of *Der Spiegel* probably meant to say, "*Grosser Generalstab*," vice "*gross-deutscher Generalstab*."

6. For an early assessment of Ruehe's policies see Guenther Wiedemann's editorial in, *Koelner Stadt-Anzeiger*, April 24, 1992.

7. The "renationalization of defense policy," vice the continuation of integrated defense planning within the Western Alliance, is currently a sensitive issue in NATO and an eventuality all of its members are loath to see come to pass. Opposition to this eventuality is stressed in, "The

Alliance's New Strategic Concept." Press Communiqué S-1(91)85, Brussels. NATO Press Service, November 7, 1991, item 38.

8. It is interesting that early in his excellent essay Van Orden characterizes German defense policy as orientated "...towards a renationalization of defence." Yet, he concludes his work with the statement, "After 40 years, the *Bundeswehr* will at last have achieved normality." Ascertaining exactly what current German defense policy is, and is oriented toward, is vexatious, even for close watchers of Germany. Cf., Van Orden, pp. 353; 369.

9. See, Karl-Heinz Kamp, *Die Debatte um den Einsatz deutscher Streitkräfte ausserhalb des Bündnisgebietes*, Interne Studie Nr. 22/1992, Sankt Augustine: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Forschungsinstitut, March 1991.

10. See, *The New York Times*, June 23, 1992.

11. Article 7 (2) of the "Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany" states: "The united Germany shall have accordingly full sovereignty over its internal and external affairs." An abridged version of the treaty can be found in, *Survival*, Volume 32, No. 6, November-December 1990, pp. 560-562.

12. *Ibid.*, Article 5, paragraph 1.

13. This NATO division of labor enabled the *Luftwaffe*, prior to unification, to concentrate its efforts on ground attack missions (*vice* air defense), but has produced an unbalanced force structure for contemporary requirements; a situation which must now be rectified by Bonn. See, Van Orden, pp. 354; 368.

14. See, *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, July 2, 1991, for an assessment of this headquarter's performance.

15. This command was initially envisaged to close April 1, 1991. However, the difficulties associated with integrating *NVA* personnel, facilities and equipment obviously presented a greater challenge than initially was anticipated. For one view of the integration of the *NVA* into the *Bundeswehr* see, Hans-Peter von Kirchbach, edited by Robert R. Ulin, *Reflections on the Growing Together of the German Armed Forces*, SSI Special Report, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, February 14, 1992.

16. See, *Survival*, Volume 32, No. 6, November-December 1990, p. 562.

17. See, Deutsche Presse-Agentur (Hamburg), July 15, 1991 in, *FBIS-WEU-91-135*, July 15, 1991, p. 16.

18. For an excellent explanation of SOFAs see, Richard Erickson, "Status of Forces Agreements: A Sharing of Sovereign Prerogative," *Air Force Law Review*, Summer 1992, forthcoming.
19. See, Deutsche Presse-Agentur (Hamburg), August 30, 1991 in, *FBIS-WEU-91-170*, September 2, 1991, p. 2.
20. See, *The Washington Post*, September 18, 1991.
21. See, *Bild am Sonntag* (Hamburg), December 2, 1991. For background on the long-standing differences between the *BMVg* and the *Auswaertiges Amt* under former Foreign Minister Genscher see, *Le Monde* (Paris), April 2, 1992.
22. See, *The Washington Post*, July 4, 1992.
23. See, *The Baltimore Sun*, September 7, 1991.
24. There is widespread political support in the Federal Republic for maintaining membership in NATO and the continued presence of foreign forces on German soil. This topic is dealt with below.
25. Notwithstanding growing restrictions on low-altitude flying in the Federal Republic, the *BMVg* continues to argue that it is necessary. See, *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* (Muenchen), February 6, 1991. For background on this issue see, *The Future of Low Flying*, Report, Document 1222, Paris: Assembly of the Western European Union, April 24, 1990.
26. Note that an increase in *Bundeswehr* deployments in the United States is underway. During Federal Defense Minister Ruehe's first official visit to Washington in July 1992, it was announced that *Luftwaffe* F-4s, currently stationed at George Air Force Base in California, would move to Holloman Air Force Base in New Mexico, where a squadron of Tornados from Germany is envisaged to be transferred. See, *ADN* (Berlin), July 2, 1992 in, *FBIS-WEU-92-128*, July 2, 1992, p. 6.
27. See, *The Washington Post*, July 4, 1992.
28. See, *Bild am Sonntag* (Hamburg), December 2, 1991 in, *FBIS-WEU-91-232*, December 3, 1991, p. 17.
29. See, *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), May 21, 1991, pp. 27-28; and, *Wirtschaftswoche* (Duesseldorf), March 22, 1991, in *FBIS-WEU-91-093*, May 14, 1991, pp. 10-11.
30. See, Joerg Schoenbohm, "Konsequenzen fuer die Heeresplanung: Armee der Einheit," *Europaeische Sicherheit*, Volume 41, No. 2, February 1992, pp. 74-83.

31. See, *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* (Muenchen), June 17-18, 1992.
32. See, *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, January 13, 1991 in, *FBIS-WEU-92-009*, January 14, 1992, pp. 13-14.
33. See, *The Washington Post*, April 19, 1992.
34. See, *Wirtschaftswoche* (Duesseldorf), April 3, 1992 in, *FBIS-WEU-92-088*, May 6, 1992, p. 16.
35. For an excellent assessment of the challenges confronting the Federal Republic in regard to *NVA* munitions stocks see, Wolfgang Flume, "Deutschland: Munitionsentsorgung laeuft an," *Soldat und Technik*, Volume 34, No. 11, November 1991, pp. 795-796.
36. See, Deutsche Presse-Agentur (Hamburg), May 2, 1992 in, *FBIS-WEU-92-086*, May 4, 1992, p. 16.
37. See, *Frankfurter Rundschau*, June 16, 1992 in, *FBIS-WEU-92-119*, June 19, 1992, p. 19.
38. See, *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* (Muenchen), September 20, 1991.
39. The 25th Fiscal Plan nominally includes fiscal year 1991 and the projected 1993-1995 period, but essentially is concerned with the 1992 budget
40. See, Holger H. Mey, "The Politics of Defense Budgeting," paper presented to the Institute for East-West Security Studies conference on, "Future National Defense Planning and the Common European Security System," the Hague, Netherlands, September 30-October 2, 1991, pp. 7; 19. I am indebted to Dr. Mey for supplying me with a copy of this excellent manuscript and allowing me to cite it.
41. See, *The Washington Post*, July 1, 1992.
42. See, *Die Welt* (Hamburg), January 6, 1992; *The Financial Times* (London), January 13, 1992; and, *Air and Cosmos* (Paris), July 13-26, 1992, p. 11.
43. See, *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* (Muenchen), May 6, 1992 in, *FBIS-WEU-92-088*, May 6, 1992, pp. 11-12.
44. See, *Welt am Sonntag* (Hamburg), June 28, 1992.
45. One published source already notes a significant deficiency in the *Bundeswehr's* operational readiness levels. See, *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* (Muenchen), July 17, 1992.

46. "Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany." Article 3, paragraphs 2 and 3.

47. See, Deutsche Presse-Agentur (Hamburg), February 19, 1992 in, *FBIS-WEU-92-034*, February 20, 1992, p. 9.

48. See, *The Wall Street Journal* (New York), July 17, 1990.

49. This resulted in former Federal Defense Minister Stoltenberg's attempt, without success, to increase the size of the army by 3,100 at the expense of the navy in February 1992. See, *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), February 10, 1992, p. 16.

50. It is anticipated that approximately 25,000 of this number will be conscripts, while the remainder will be longer service, to include around 2,800 officers and 1,300 warrant officers, some of whom will have held commissions in the NVA. Information provided by official German sources.

51. Information provided by official German sources.

52. See, *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), March 23, 1992, p. 17.

53. See, Heinz Schulte, "JDW Interview with General Klaus Naumann," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Volume 16, No. 14, October 5, 1991, p. 636.

54. See, Wolfgang Fechner, "Ubergang zur Heeresstruktur 5: Reduktion 'mit dem Rasenmaeher?'," *Europaeische Sicherheit*, Volume 40, No. 9, September 1991, pp. 509-511.

55. See, von Kirchbach, pp. 12-15 for discussion on this point.

56. The *BMVg* has admitted that the *Bundeswehr* has a shortage of 10,000 NCOs and the number of younger officers is stagnating. This is a direct result of the uncertain future of a military career. See, *Die Welt* (Hamburg), January 29, 1992.

57. See, *Welt am Sonntag* (Hamburg), January 12, 1992.

58. See, *Koelner Stadt-Anzeiger*, April 22, 1992; and, Deutscher Presse-Agentur (Hamburg), May 12, 1992 in, *FBIS-WEU-92-093*, May 13, 1992, p. 23, for Federal Chancellor Kohl's remarks that he will never sign a law abolishing conscription.

59. See, *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, April 3, 1992.

60. Note that Federal Defense Minister Volker Ruehe, upon taking office, stated that he supports the continuation of conscription, as well as its 12 month duration. See, *Koelner Stadt-Anzeiger*, April 2, 1992. For a serving *Bundeswehr* officer's argument for a professional military see,

Juergen Kieschoweit, "Wehrpflicht- oder Berufsarmee oder was?", *Truppenpraxis*, Volume 36, No.2, March-April 1992, pp. 136-140.

61. See, *Stern* (Hamburg), September 26, 1991, pp. 248-252.

62. Recent press reports state that the reaction formations of the *Bundeswehr* (which are to number 50,000), will be available in 1995. See, *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, July 30, 1992.

63. *Ibid.*; "Das Heer auf dem Weg in das Jahr 2000," *Wehrtechnik*, Volume 24, No. 2, February 1992, pp. 21-28; and, Van Orden, p. 370 (note 37).

64. For background on *Heeresstruktur 5* see, Erhard Drews, *et al.*, "Das neue deutsche Heer: Zielsetzung, Konzeption, und Elemente der Heeresstruktur 5," *Truppenpraxis*, Volume 35, No. 4, July-August 1991, pp. 356-367. For an assessment of its logistical aspects see, Richard Bulheller, *et al.*, "Leistungsstark trotz Schlankheitskur: Logistik und Sanitaetsdienst in der Heeresstruktur 5," *Truppenpraxis*, Volume 35, No. 6, November-December 1991, pp. 582-591. For an in depth analysis of how this will affect armored forces see, Karl-Theo Schleicher, *Truppenpraxis*, Volume 36, No. 1, January-February 1992, pp. 38-46.

65. See, Helge Hansen, *Wehrtechnik*, No. 2, February 1992, p. 8.

66. See, "Das Heer auf dem Weg...", *Wehrtechnik*.

67. Information provided by official German sources. Cf., *Koelner Stadt-Anzeiger*, June 20-12, 1992.

68. See, *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), February 10, 1992, p. 16.

69. See, Van Order, pp. 354; 368.

70. See, Hans-Joerg Kuebart, "The Future German Air Force: Tasks, Execution and Structure," *NATO's Sixteen Nations*, Volume 36, No. 6, November 1991, p. 102.

71. Obtaining replacement parts for these aircraft from the former Soviet Union has become so difficult that during Russian Air Force Chief of Staff General Petr Deynekin's visit to the Federal Republic in December 1991, he brought along boxes of urgently needed spare parts for the MIG-29s! See, *Welt am Sonntag* (Hamburg), January 12, 1992.

72. See, Willy Schmider, *et al.*, "Aus dem schwierigen Weg zur Luftwaffenstruktur 4," *Truppenpraxis*, Volume 35, No. 4, September-October 1991, pp. 464-474.

73. Note that while the actual number of batteries will remain constant, the organizational structure is to be rationalized and the overall number of battery crews will shrink.

74. See, *The Washington Post*, July 1, 1992.

75. For background on this issue see Michael Inacker's interview with Volker Ruehe in, *Welt am Sonntag* (Hamburg), May 10, 1992; and, *The Washington Post*, July 1, 1992.

76. See, Deutsche Presse-Agentur (Hamburg), June 29, 1992 in, *FBIS-WEU-92-126*, June 30, 1992, p. 13.

77. See, *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, January 13, 1992.

78. See the interview with General Klaus Naumann in, Deutschlandfunk Network (Cologne), January 5, 1992 in, *FBIS-WEU-92-003*, pp. 14-15.

79. See, Volker Hogrebe, "Bound for the Future," *Schiff & Hafen/Seewirtschaft* (6), June 1991, pp. 14-18 in, *FBIS-WEU-91-147*, July 31, 1991, p. 18.

80. Information supplied by official German government sources.

81. See, *Die Welt* (Hamburg), April 11, 1992.

82. See, Hans Frank and Christian Giermann, "The Navy 2005," *Marine Forum* (7/8), July-August 1991, pp. 233-235 in, *FBIS-WEU-91-175*, September 10, 1991, pp. 12-16.

83. For a biased, yet informative, review of civil-military relations in the Federal Republic see, *Der Spiegel*, July 20, 1992, pp. 22-29 in, *FBIS-WEU-92-148*, July 31, 1992, pp. 6-10.

84. See, *The Washington Post*, July 16, 1992; and, *Koelner Stadt-Anzeiger*, July 13, 1992.

85. For a comprehensive analysis of this interesting subject see, Donald Abenheim, *Reforging the Iron Cross: The Search for Tradition in the West German Armed Forces*, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988.

86. For an excellent explanation of this concept see, Donald Abenheim, "The Citizen in Uniform: Reform and its Critics in the *Bundeswehr*," in *The West German Armed Forces and Western Defense*, edited by Stephen Szabo, London: Macmillan, 1990.

87. See, Georg-Maria Meyer, *Armee in Umbruch. Soziale Deutungsmuster von Bataillonskommandeuren der Bundeswehr*, Berichte H. 56, Muenchen: Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr, 1992.

88. See, *Wirtschaftswoche* (Duesseldorf), October 25, 1991 and October 11, 1991 in, *FBIS-WEU*-91-216, November 7, 1991, pp. 10-12.

89. See, *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, November 1, 1991 in, *FBIS-WEU*-91-224, November 20, 1991, p. 21.

90. See, Abenheim, *Reforging the Iron Cross*, pp. 64-89; 165-174.

91. See, *Welt am Sonntag* (Hamburg), March 1, 1992.

92. Concerning the *BMVg*'s inability to provide adequate direction in military operations see *Konteradmiral a.D.* Elmar Schmaehling's article in, *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), April 20, 1992, p. 93.

93. For background on changes to NATO's command and operational control arrangements see, Thomas-Durell Young and William T. Johnsen, *Reforming NATO's Command and Operational Control Structures: Progress and Problems*, SSI Special Report, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, April 30, 1992.

94. See, *White Paper 1985: The Situation and the Development of the Federal Armed Forces*, Bonn: The Federal Minister of Defence, 1985, p. 72.

95. See, *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), April 6, 1992, p. 19.

96. The best study in English on the Prussian-German General Staff is, Walter Goerlitz, *History of the German General Staff, 1657-1945*, translated by Brian Battershaw, New York: Praeger, 1953. For a brief historical background on the Prussian-German General Staff system and its influence on the *Bundeswehr* see, Christian O.E. Millotat, *Understanding the Prussian-German General Staff System*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1992.

97. The *Bundeswehr*'s deployment to the Middle East was criticized by its Ombudsman for poor planning and execution. See, *Koelner Stadt-Anzeiger*, March 13, 1992.

98. See, *Welt am Sonntag* (Hamburg), March 1, 1992.

99. See, Egon Bahr, "Ein Generalstab kein Tabu mehr," *Europaeische Sicherheit*, Volume 41 (3), 1992, p. 127.

100. See, for example, one SPD parliamentarian's view on Article 24 and command difficulties posed by the creation of the Franco-German

Brigade. Hermann Scheer. "Ein grundgesetzwidriges Vorhaben." *Sozialdemokratischer Pressedienst*, November 20, 1987, cited in Matthew A. Weiller, "SPD Security Policy," *Survival* Volume 30, No. 6, November-December 1988, p. 522.

101. Information provided by official German sources.

102. See, *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* (Muenchen), December 7, 1991.

103. The issue of "planning" should not be underestimated. Heretofore, the *Bundeswehr* has not possessed national war plans, these being provided by SACEUR's General Defense Plans, executed at the AFCENT, Allied Tactical Air Force and Army Group levels. Now that eastern Germany currently falls outside of NATO operational control structures and there already are service command structures in the *Bundeswehr*, it is only logical that national war planning should take place. However, one would expect that these plans will largely deal with the defense of eastern Germany (at least until 1995) and out-of-area campaigns, all of which would probably be effected in conjunction with Alliance efforts.

104. See, Drews *et al.*, pp. 362-365.

105. For instance, Former Federal Defense Minister Stoltenberg attempted, without success, in early 1992 to increase the size of the Army by 3,100 at the expense of the Navy. See, *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), February 10, 1992, p. 16.

106. See for instance, *Welt am Sonntag* (Hamburg), March 1, 1992.

107. See, *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), April 6, 1992, pp. 18-21.

108. See, *Koelner Stadt-Anzeiger*, April 6, 1992; and, *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), April 20, 1992, p. 93.

109. See, Peter Vogler, "Schluessige Daten," *Wehrtechnik*, Volume 24 (5), May 1992, pp. 43-48.

110. See, *Die Welt* (Hamburg), April 7, 1992.

111. See, *Die Welt* (Hamburg), April 18, 1992 in, *FBIS-WEU-92-076*, April 20, 1992, p. 6.

112. The only discernable defense policy positions recently taken by the SPD relate to that party's opposition to the *Bundeswehr* engaging in out-of-area operations and the procurement of the European Fighter Aircraft; the latter due to financial considerations. As one German official stated to me in an interview in Bonn, for the SPD to articulate a defense

policy would require it to think strategically; something this official felt it was currently incapable of doing. See, for example, *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, May 15, 1992 for a report on contemporary SPD positions on foreign and defense policies.

113. See, *The Washington Post*, May 17 and May 23, 1992.

114. See, *The Washington Post*, March 31, 1992.

115. "If the Germans are unable to achieve the predictability they crave through the benign methods they have chosen thus far, they will have little choice but to turn to power as the organizing principle in their relations with the outside world. That is an outcome Germany's leadership, to its credit, is striving to avoid." For an excellent and convincing brief assessment of German foreign policy objectives see Jim Hoagland's editorial in, *The Washington Post*, February 20, 1992.

116. For an assessment of the *Bundeswehr's* problems in simply deploying medical personnel to Cambodia to support the United Nations' peace effort see, *Die Welt* (Hamburg), June 1, 1992.

117. See, *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), January 20, 1992, pp. 33-35; *The Wall Street Journal* (New York), February 4, 1992 and April 29, 1992; *The Washington Times*, March 5, 1992; and, *The Washington Post*, March 11, 1992. The issue of public support for the continued stationing of U.S. forces in the Federal Republic is very complicated. For the best analysis I have seen to date on explaining German public opinion on this issue, see Josef Joffe's excellent essay in, *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* (Muenchen), February 4, 1992 in, *FBIS-WEU-92-030*, February 13, 1992, pp. 11-12.

118. For a brief assessment of the criticisms leveled against Bonn due to its policies on Yugoslavia see, *The Washington Post*, December 12, 1991. Flora Lewis writes, "All the evidence suggests that puzzling foreign policy initiatives such as the stand on Croatia...are constituent driven rather [than] that planned from the top to recreate a German sphere of influence." See, *The New York Times*, April 7, 1992.

119. See Federal Chancellor Kohl's remarks to the 33rd *Bundeswehr* commanders' conference concerning the need for a European defense identity. See, Deutsche Presse-Agentur (Hamburg), May 12, 1992 in, *FBIS-WEU-92-093*, May 13, 1992, p. 23. For an excellent brief assessment of current U.S.-German diplomatic problems see, *The Washington Post*, June 27, 1992.

120. See, *The New York Times*, May 12, 1992.

121. See, *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* (Muenchen), June 12, 1992.

122. See, *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, March 23, 1992 in, *FBIS-WEU-92-058*, March 25, 1992, pp. 15-16.

123. See, *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, July 20, 1992; and, *The Washington Post*, July 16, 1992.

124. See, Deutsche Presse-Agentur (Hamburg), May 14, 1992 in, *FBIS-WEU-92-094*, May 14, 1992, p. 6.

125. See, *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), March 16, 1992, pp. 20-21; 22-23.

126. The importance of placating France is evident in the reported German official opinion that, despite lacking "reality," the Franco-German sponsored European Corps initiative needs to be supported. See, *Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt* (Bonn), October 25, 1991.

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